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ABSTRACT 
 
The Children and Families Act 2014 pursues the twin policies of increasing the number of children 
adopted out of compulsory state care and reducing the scope for court-ordered contact between such 
children and their birth families. Building upon previous work by Dr. Kirsty Hughes and myself, 
this paper critically evaluates these reforms to post-adoption contact in view of the fact that 
adoption terminates the legal relationship of parent and child. Aspects of the analysis include the 
impact of the proposals on "open adoption" and child welfare in the light of the available empirical 
evidence, and their compatibility with both the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Adoption terminates the legal relationship between the child to be adopted and his or her natural 
parents.
1
 It has been described as the “most draconian interference with family life possible”.2 
Adoption has nevertheless been central to the child protection policy of both the current and the 
previous UK Governments, being seen as an ideal method of providing a suitable home 
environment for children who cannot remain with their birth families. Post-adoption contact could 
be regarded as a means of mitigating the severity of adoption by permitting a child to retain some 
link with his or her birth family. This article, however, sets out critically to evaluate the fact that it 
is current Government policy both to increase the number and speed of adoptions of children from 
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compulsory state foster care and to reduce the scope for post-adoption contact between such 
children and their birth families. 
The article begins by setting out English adoption law and policy, including the reforms to 
the process pursued in the Children and Families Act 2014 notwithstanding the fact that this area 
was overhauled as recently as 2005 when the Adoption and Children Act 2002 came fully into 
force. It then moves to its primary concern of post-adoption contact, analysing pre-existing law and 
practice before criticising the changes heralded by the Children and Families Act in the light of both 
the principle that the child’s welfare is the paramount consideration in court decisions (the “welfare 
principle”) and the available empirical evidence on post-adoption contact.  
Finally, the article conducts a “human rights audit”3 of the post-adoption contact reforms. It 
argues that the Children and Families Act further jeopardises English Law’s compatibility with both 
the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child as 
regards its approach to post-adoption contact. In doing so, however, the article highlights the 
limitations of these international human rights conventions in providing a clear answer to the 
compatibility question. 
  
II. ADOPTION LAW & POLICY IN ENGLAND & WALES 
 
Adoption policy in England and Wales is dominated by the notion that the stability provided by 
swift adoption is generally beneficial for children who have to be removed from their parents and 
might otherwise drift through state-provided foster care.
4
 The Adoption and Children Act 2002 
unashamedly aimed to bring about “more adoptions, more quickly” for children in care.5 Indeed, 
local authorities are placed under a duty to initiate adoption proceedings (by applying for an initial 
“placement order”)6 where inter alia the authority is “satisfied that the child ought to be placed for 
adoption”,7 and in the context of the 2002 Act it has been recognised as legitimate for a local 
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authority to seek such an order “even though it recognises the reality that a search for adoptive 
parents may be unsuccessful”.8 The policy of securing more adoptions, pursued in spite of 
apparently mixed outcomes for children adopted out of care,
9
 can also be seen from the fact that the 
Act allows an adoption agency to place a child with a view to adoption by virtue of the consent of a 
child’s parents (with parental responsibility)10 or his or her guardian, without the need for a court 
order,
11
 and the fact that such people can provide advance consent to the final and necessary 
adoption order at the same time.
12
 If consent is not forthcoming from parents with parental 
responsibility, a court can dispense with the need for it if the child’s welfare “requires” that it be 
dispensed with,13 and the adoption can proceed on the basis of welfare alone provided either that the 
relevant parents have at some stage consented to the process or that the criteria for state care (based 
on the existence or likelihood of significant harm to the child) have been made out.14 Moreover, the 
Act instructs the courts and adoption agencies “at all times” to “bear in mind that, in general, any 
delay in coming to [a] decision [relating to adoption] is likely to prejudice the child’s welfare”.15 
The prioritisation of adoptions obviously has profound implications for the child’s birth 
family and his or her relationship with them, but is carried further in the Children and Families Act 
in the light of continued concerns that adoption is not proceeding quickly enough.
16
 That Act 
received Royal Assent in March 2014, and commencement of many of its specific adoption-related 
provisions will occur in stages throughout 2014.
17
 Section 2 of the 2014 Act will impose a duty on 
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an English local authority considering adoption for a given child also to consider placing the child 
“with a local authority foster parent who has been approved as a prospective adopter”,18 albeit now 
only where the local authority decides that placement with a “a relative, friend or other person 
connected with [the child]…who is also a local authority foster parent”19 is “not the most 
appropriate placement”.20 This placement with prospective adopters has become known as a 
“fostering for adoption” placement,21 and it effectively requires the local authority to consider 
placing the child with prospective adopters notwithstanding the very fact that the local authority do 
not “yet have authorisation to place the child for adoption” from either the birth parents or a court.22 
Where the conditions for a “fostering for adoption” placement apply, the Act would also expressly 
disapply
23
 the local authority’s statutory duty,24 inter alia, to give any further preference in foster 
placements to a foster parent who is also a “relative, friend or other person connected with” the 
child.
25
 
When evaluating English adoption law and practice, the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child expressed concern that “children of African descent and children of ethnic minorities 
sometimes face a long period waiting for adoption by a family of the same ethnic origin”,26 and 
recommended that the state “strengthen its efforts to facilitate a situation in which children, always 
in their best interests, be adopted as speedily as possible, taking in due account, inter alia, [of] their 
cultural background”.27 The Act’s response to this problem of delay, however, is to remove28 the 
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existing specific obligation to “give due consideration to the child's religious persuasion, racial 
origin and cultural and linguistic background” in England.29 That said, the Explanatory Notes to the 
Act emphasise that a local authority “will remain under a duty to have regard to the child’s religious 
persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background, amongst other factors, where 
relevant”,30 and that the reform is merely “intended to avoid any suggestion that the current 
legislation places a child’s religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background 
above the factors” listed elsewhere in the 2002 Act.31 The 2014 Act additionally aims to increase 
co-operation between adoption agencies in recruiting, assessing and approving prospective 
adopters,
32
 and to reform adoption support services.
33
 
The Government has claimed that it is not its intention that “kinship carers should be 
overlooked as a consequence of the clause in [what was then] the Bill concerning fostering for 
adoption”.34 Interested parties including the Children’s Commissioner and the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights expressed concern that this would in fact be the effect of the original Bill,
35
 although 
it contained different drafting.
36
 In any case, it is not clear that the current drive towards increasing 
the number of adoptions is consistent with Lord Neuberger’s recent assertion in the Supreme Court 
that the “adoption of a child against her parents' wishes should only be contemplated as a last resort 
– when all else fails”,37 which has already been very influential (alongside similar assertions) in the 
lower courts.
38
 On Lord Neuberger’s analysis, “the court must be satisfied that there is no practical 
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way of the authorities (or others) providing the requisite assistance and support” to render adoption 
unnecessary.
39
 It is telling that the Select Committee on Adoption Legislation (“SCAL”) has urged 
the Government “not to undermine the potential benefit of preventative programmes by focusing on 
adoption at the expense of early intervention”, and expressed concern that “the Government’s focus 
on adoption risks disadvantaging those children in care for whom adoption is not suitable”.40 
Nevertheless, the Committee also agreed with the Government’s position that “there is scope to 
increase the number of children benefitting from adoption”.41 
 The focus of this article is on decisions not about whether adoption should occur in the first 
place, but about contact between the adoptee and his birth family once the adoption has occurred. It 
could be argued, however, that the insistence on promoting adoption as a solution for looked-after 
children only increases the importance of recognising the link between birth parent and adopted 
child in appropriate cases notwithstanding the severance of the relevant legal parenthood. In spite of 
this, the next section of this article demonstrates that the Government has not taken this attitude. 
 
III. POST-ADOPTION CONTACT 
 
A. Current Law & Practice 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
[30] (McFarlane L.J.); Re P (A Child) (Care and Placement: Evidential Basis of Local Authority Case) [2013] EWCA 
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(Pauffley J.); Re W (A Child) (Care Proceedings: Welfare Evaluation: Functions of Local Authority) [2013] EWCA Civ 
1227, [2014] 1 F.C.R. 260, at [94] (Ryder L.J.); Re W (A Child) (Adoption Order: Leave to Oppose) [2013] EWCA Civ 
1177, [2014] 1 F.C.R. 191, at [22] (Sir James Munby); Re C (A Child) (Appeal from Care and Placement Orders), 
[2013] EWCA Civ 1257, [2014] 1 F.C.R. 173, at [18] (McFarlane L.J.); Re L (Leave to Oppose Making of Adoption 
Order) [2013] EWCA Civ 1481, [2014] Family Law 275, at [53] (Black L.J.); Re HA (Capacity to Change) [2013] 
EWHC 3634 (Fam), [2014] Family Law 277, at [57] (Baker J.); Re A (Placement Order: Imposition of Conditions on 
Adoption) [2013] EWCA Civ 1611, [2014] Family Law 279, at [39] (McFarlane L.J.); RO v A Local Authority [2014] 
EWHC 97 (Fam), at [11] (Keehan J.); The Prospective Adopters v IA and London Borough of Croydon [2014] EWHC 
331 (Fam), at [28] (Moor J.). See, generally, L. Sprinz, “Adoption in 2014” [2014] Family Law 335. 
39
 [2013] UKSC 33, at [105]. 
40
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It is necessary to begin with an analysis of law and practice as they stand pending the entry into 
force of the post-adoption contact provisions in the 2014 Act. Historically, post-adoption contact 
was effectively considered to be anathema to the nature of adoption. The prevailing view, as J.C. 
Hall expressed it in 1987, was that “continued access by a natural parent is repugnant to the purpose 
of adoption, which is to effect the complete legal transplant of the child from one family to 
another”.42 There has, however, been something of a move towards “open adoption”,43 involving 
the freer exchange of information between the parties to an adoption as an alternative to the secrecy 
that traditionally characterised the process, which has called into question the “transplant” model.44 
While the SCAL claims that practice on the issue “varies considerably”,45 “[m]ost children now 
adopted in England and Wales are planned to have some form of contact with members of their 
birth family”,46 reflecting the increasing age of adopted children, the consequent fact that more of 
them will remember, and/or become curious about, their birth families, and the perceived benefits 
of post-adoption contact.
47
 Contact of this sort will usually take an indirect form,
48
 such as letterbox 
contact, which one adoption agency defines as “an arrangement where adoptive parents, birth 
families and adopted children agree to exchange letters, photographs, cards and/or gift vouchers”, 
mediated by the agency.
49
  
But in spite of the pragmatic approach taken by adoption agencies, courts remained resistant 
to the imposition of such contact against the wishes of the adoptive family.
50
 Since the 2002 Act 
obliges the court to consider “whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact 
with the child” before making an adoption order,51 there was a chance that the courts could have 
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 J.C. Hall, “Problems of adoption and custodianship” [1987] C.L.J. 40, 42. 
43
 See, e.g., B. Lindley, “Open Adoption – Is the Door Ajar?” [1997] Child & Family Law Quarterly 115. 
44
 See, e.g., K. O’Halloran, The Politics of Adoption: International Perspectives on Law, Policy & Practice, 2nd ed. 
(Dordrecht 2009), pp. 43-44.  
45
 Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, Adoption: Post-Legislative Scrutiny Report, at [260]. 
46
 E. Neil, “Post-Adoption Contact and Openness in Adoptive Parents’ Minds: Consequences for Children’s 
Development” (2009) 39 British Journal of Social Work 5, 6. 
47
 But see C. Smith and J. Logan, “Adoptive Parenthood as a ‘Legal Fiction’ – Its Consequences for Direct Post-
Adoption Contact” [2002] Child & Family Law Quarterly 281 for an account of the differing views on this issue. 
48
 Select Committee on Adoption Legislation, Adoption: Post-Legislative Scrutiny Report, at [255]. 
49
 London Borough of Richmond Upon Thames, Adoption Contact: Information for Birth Relatives (date unknown), p. 
2. 
50
 See, e.g., Re V (A Minor) (Adoption: Consent) [1987] Fam. 57. 
51
 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 46(6). Similar obligations are imposed when the court is making a placement 
order: s. 27(4)(a). 
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been prompted to change their approach following its being brought into force in 2005. As a matter 
of purely domestic law, it was clear that the child’s welfare was to be treated as the “paramount” 
consideration in decisions about post-adoption contact, whether by virtue of the older Children Act 
1989 or the 2002 Act.
52
 As ever,
53
 however, the real question was what that meant. 
In its 2008 decision in Re P (Placement Orders: Parental Consent),
54
 the Court of Appeal 
considered contact in relation to adoption, albeit “with caution”55 since the contact issue was “not 
determinative of the appeal”.56 It concluded that it was: 
 
…not…a proper exercise of the judicial powers given to the court under the 2002 Act to 
leave contact between the [relevant] children themselves, or between the children and their 
natural parents, to the discretion of the local authority and/or the prospective carers of [the 
two siblings who were the subjects of the proceedings], be they adoptive parents or foster 
carers.
57
 
 
This could have heralded a much more interventionist attitude in contact decisions related to 
adoption. But the Court in that case was largely concerned with its jurisdiction to order contact 
during placement for adoption under the 2002 Act. Contact at the placement stage, before the 
adoption has occurred, is obviously distinct from post-adoption contact and has much in common 
with contact while a child is simply in foster care. Moreover, the subsequent decision of Re C (A 
Child) (Indirect Contact), which concerned provision of an annual photograph to the (birth) father 
of a child being placed for adoption, demonstrates that indirect contact may not necessarily be 
ordered even when a child has merely been placed for adoption.
58
 The Court of Appeal in Re C held 
that in making the order stipulating the provision of the photograph “without hearing response from 
the local authority and [initially] without reasoning his conclusion”, the Recorder had paid “scant 
regard to the interests and rights of the child”59 and ignored important evidence “to the effect 
generally that indirect contact between father and child should be in consultation with, and 
                                                          
52
 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 1; Children Act 1989, s. 1. 
53
 See, e.g., H. Reece, “The Paramountcy Principle: Consensus or Construct?” (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 267. 
54
 [2008] 2 F.L.R. 625. 
55
 Ibid., at para. [54]. 
56
 Ibid., at para. [141]. 
57
 Ibid., at para. [153] (Wall L.J., giving the judgment of the Court). 
58
 [2012] EWCA Civ 1281, [2013] 2 F.L.R. 272. 
59
 Ibid., at para. [3]. 
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impliedly subject to…the approval of[,] the child’s therapist”.60 It does appear that there were 
serious procedural problems with the case, and the Court of Appeal’s short judgment allowing the 
local authority’s appeal is at least focused on genuine concerns about the particular child’s welfare. 
In spite of its focus on pre-adoption contact, the Court of Appeal in Re P also conducted a 
thorough review of the authorities on post-adoption contact and concluded (technically obiter) that 
“[a]ll this…now falls to be revisited” in the light of the contact provisions and the particular 
meaning of welfare contained in the 2002 Act.
61
 While the Court did not know whether its “views 
on contact on the facts of this particular case presage[d] a more general sea change in post-adoption 
contact overall”,62 its judgment noted that “the 2002 Act envisages the court exercising its powers 
to make contact orders post adoption, where such orders are in the interests of the child 
concerned”.63 
In the subsequent case of Re J (A Child) (Adopted Child: Contact),
64
 however, the Court of 
Appeal was adamant that the ultimate jurisdiction to make a post-adoption contact order was still 
contained the Children Act 1989,
65
 under which the older, conservative approach to the matter had 
prevailed. This meant that the issue of post-adoption contact was not governed by the “extended 
meaning” of welfare in the 2002 Act,66 which specifically directs the court to consider the effect of 
ceasing to be a member of the birth family and the child’s relationships with relatives as aspects of 
the child’s welfare.67 It also confirmed that post-adoption contact was not directly subjected to the 
change in the importance of welfare heralded by the 2002 Act, whereby it became the “paramount” 
rather than merely the “first” consideration in relation to certain decisions as regards adoption.68 
Lord Neuberger M.R. reaffirmed in the judgment of the Court that “it is ‘extremely unusual’ to 
                                                          
60
 Ibid., at para. [3]. 
61
 [2008] EWCA Civ 535, at [147] (Wall L.J., giving the judgment of the Court). 
62
 [2008] EWCA Civ 535, at [154]. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 [2010] EWCA Civ 581, [2011] Fam. 31. For a detailed analysis of this case, see K. Hughes and B. Sloan, “Post-
adoption Photographs: Welfare, Rights and Judicial Reasoning” [2011] Child & Family Law Quarterly 393. 
65
 [2010] EWCA Civ 581, at [5]. See Hughes and Sloan, “Post-adoption Photographs”, pp. 398-402 for discussion. 
66
 Re C (A Child) (Adoption: Duty of Local Authority) [2007] EWCA Civ 1206, [2008] Fam. 54, at [18] (Arden L.J.). 
67
 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 1(4)(c) and s. 1(4)(f).  
68
 Cf. Adoption Act 1976, s. 6. 
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make an order [for contact] with which the adoptive parents are not in agreement”,69 applying the 
test set down in Re R (Adoption: Contact) immediately before the 2002 Act had come into effect.
70
  
The test for the substantive decision on post-adoption contact differed significantly from that 
applied when granting permission to apply for such contact before the advent of the 2014 Act. As 
the law stands before the entry into force of the Act’s post-adoption contact provisions, the leave of 
the court is required where (as in Re J) the natural parents make a free-standing application for post-
adoption contact after the adoption order occurs rather than making one simultaneously with the 
application for the adoption order, since they are no longer legal parents in the former scenario.
71
 In 
its 2011 judgment in Re B (Child), the Court of Appeal held that leave would be granted where 
there is “something that merits investigation”,72 since “[t]he grant of permission does nothing but 
allow [the applicant] to cross the threshold”, even though the court was reguired to consider any 
risk of harm to the child alongside the applicant's connection and the nature of the application.
73
 It 
will be seen, however, that this generous approach to the granting of leave has been threatened by 
the Children and Families Act. 
On the facts of Re J, the Court refused to order that the natural parents who had consented to 
the adoption of their infant should receive and retain an annual photograph of the child in the face 
of opposition from the adoptive parents. Priority was given to the stability of the placement in the 
light of the adoptive parents’ fears that it could be disrupted by the retention of the photographs, in 
spite of the fact that the judge below had described those fears as “understandable but rather 
farfetched”.74 Dr. Hughes and I criticised the decision for failing adequately to distinguish the 
welfare of the child from the wishes of the adoptive parents, as well as giving insufficient 
consideration to international human rights norms.
75
 
Re J does not mean that an opposed post-adoption contact application will never succeed 
under the pre-2014 Act law. In MF v London Borough of Brent, Ryder L.J. (sitting in the Family 
Division of the High Court) made an order for direct contact between a seven-year-old would-be 
adoptee and members of his birth family where the order (but not the contact itself) was opposed by 
                                                          
69
 [2010] EWCA Civ 581, at [26] (Lord Neuberger M.R., giving the judgment of the Court). See also Re T (A Child) 
(Adoption: Contact) [2010] EWCA Civ 1527, [2011] 1 F.L.R. 1805.  
70
 [2005] EWCA Civ 1128, [2006] 1 F.L.R. 373. 
71
 Children Act 1989, s. 10, , it being unlikely that s. 10(5)(b) will apply. 
72
 [2011] EWCA Civ 509, [2011] 2 F.L.R. 1179, at [9] (Thorpe L.J.), ; Children Act 1989, s. 10(9). 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 [2010] EWCA Civ 581, at [17]. 
75
 Hughes and Sloan, “Post-adoption Photographs”. 
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the eventual adopter.
76
 In spite of Lord Neuberger’s judgment in Re J, Ryder L.J. had reference to 
both the 1989 Act and the 2002 Act in reaching his conclusion in MF, since he asserted both that 
the 2002 Act “envisages situations like this case where a section 8 Children Act 1989 application is 
made for contact which is heard at the same time as the application for an adoption order”,77 and 
that the relevant child’s “welfare throughout his life requires the maintenance of a relationship with 
his maternal grandmother and sister through whom there will be a relationship with his extended 
birth family”.78 Ryder L.J. held that the adoption and contact orders were “inextricably linked on 
the facts of this case”, that both orders were “necessary”, and that the “success of the adoption order 
is in part dependent upon a minimum level of contact with [the child’s] birth family[,] particularly 
his sister and maternal grandmother”.79 Ryder L.J.’s assessment of the evidence is admirable, but 
his judgment might legitimately be criticised for failing to engage with the details of the case law. 
He did cite Re R and Re J, but he also cited Re P and omitted to explain precisely how MF was 
sufficiently “unusual” to merit departure from Lord Neuberger’s default approach.80 It may also be 
significant that the relevant child was older than the one in Re J, and that in MF contact was ordered 
not with the child’s birth parents but with other members of the family.81 
While cases are self-evidently fact-dependent, Re J must ultimately be taken as representing 
the dominant legal position before the modifications heralded by the 2014 Act, such that it will be 
“extremely unusual” for post-adoption contact to be ordered against the wishes of the adoptive 
parents. As it stands, the law therefore diverges significantly from social work practice, moves close 
to imposing a presumption against ordered contact, takes a rather narrow view of a child’s best 
interests and carries an air of futility since an order is unlikely to be made in the very sort of case 
where it is most likely to be necessary. Indeed, one judge has recently referred to the “exceptional 
nature of contact orders together with adoption orders”.82 It will be seen in the next section, 
however, that this position was still apparently insufficiently limiting for the Government and one 
of its prominent advisors. 
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B. Reforms in the Children and Families Act: The New Sections 51A and 51B of the 2002 Act 
 
Changes are made to the law on post-adoption contact by the Children and Families Act. Section 9 
of the Act inserts new sections 51A and 51B concerning post-adoption contact into the 2002 Act.
83
 
Some changes to post-adoption contact would be necessary as a result of the 2014 Act’s abolition of 
“residence” and “contact” orders under the section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (generally used for a 
child whose parents do not live together but remain both remain legal parents) and their 
replacement with a single “child arrangements order”.84 Indeed, it is logical that the 2002 Act’s 
specific assertion that the provisions governing contact during placement for adoption do not 
“prevent an application for a contact order under section 8 of the 1989 Act being made where the 
application is to be heard together with an application for an adoption order” is removed by the 
Act.
85
 Other, more substantive, changes are also made, in spite of the SCAL’s assertion that it had 
received no evidence that any change to the legislative framework was required.
86
 A significant 
limitation of its report, however, is that its evidence hearings were concluded before the specific 
text of the proposed sections 51A and 51B were published.
87
  
Several of the provisions in the Act reflect the view expressed in the foreword to the 
relevant Government consultation paper by Sir Martin Narey, the ministerial adviser on adoption 
known for his “unequivocally pro-adoption” stance,88 that post-adoption contact “harms children 
too often”.89 That paper proceeded to suggest legislative change without any real consideration of 
the courts’ current approach to ordering post-adoption contact, and the Government retained its 
view on the need for change in several respects after the consultation process culminating in the 
relevant aspects of the Children and Families Act.
90
 This was in spite of the fact that in extensive 
empirical work Neil et al found “little evidence that birth family contact has any great impact on 
broad outcomes of adoption such as placement breakdown, relationships with adoptive parents and 
                                                          
83
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and birth relatives of a person adopted before the entry into force of the 2002 Act. 
84
 Children and Families Act 2014, s. 12. 
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children's general development”.91 While acknowledging that “contact, even when wanted, can be a 
mixed experience” for adopted children,92 they cited evidence that adopted children remaining in 
touch with birth relatives “in general…emerged as young adults with a sense of belonging in their 
new family and a realistic view of their birth family”,93 and that many who were unhappy about 
contact felt as they did because it had stopped or because they did not have contact with particular 
birth relatives.
94
 Most significantly, Neil et al emphasised the value of “individualised decision-
making”, and argued that there was “no need to change legislation in the direction of restricting 
contact”,95 albeit that they did make suggestions for improvement in practice.96 They went so far as 
to express concern that “a return to the more closed adoption practices of the past could actually 
bring about an increase in unmediated and unsolicited contact between children and their birth 
relatives”.97 
In any case, where a local authority has placed or was authorised to place a child for 
adoption,
98
 the 2014 Act gives the court a specific power to make an order concerning post-
adoption contact “[w]hen making the adoption order or at any time afterwards” (effectively 
replacing the current mechanism of the section 8 contact order).
99
 The new post-adoption contact 
order could be positive, “requiring” the adoptive parents “to allow the child to visit or stay with the 
person named in the order…, or for the person named in that order and the child otherwise to have 
contact with each other”.100 But it could also be negative, “prohibiting the person named in the 
order…from having contact with the child”,101 and it could be made subject to “any conditions the 
court thinks appropriate”.102 The person “named in the order”, i.e. the person on whom the right to 
contact is conferred or who is prohibited from having contact, must fall into a recognised category. 
                                                          
91
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The relevant categories are a person who “(but for the child’s adoption) would be related to the 
child by blood (including half-blood), marriage or civil partnership”,103 a former guardian,104 a 
person who had parental responsibility for the child immediately before the making of the adoption 
order,
105
 a person who was entitled to apply for contact during placement by virtue of subsisting 
contact, residence or inherent jurisdiction arrangements at the time (inter alia)
106
 the local authority 
was authorised to place the child,
107
 and a person with whom the child has lived for at least a year in 
certain circumstances.
108
 The framing of the category including blood relatives is interesting given 
the general attitude to the birth family displayed the Act, since surely the birth family remain related 
to the child by blood irrespective of the child’s adoption.  
Significantly, while the adoptive parents
109
 and the child
110
 could apply for the new order 
without leave (presumably largely for the purposes of applying for a negative order in the case of 
the adoptive parents), all other applicants including the birth parents would be obliged to seek leave 
to apply for the new post-adoption contact order from the court. This removes the distinction as 
regards leave currently in place between a contact application made simultaneously with an 
adoption application and one made in subsequent proceedings, such that the change is at least 
rational. But it arguably prejudices the child’s relationship with birth parents still further. 
 In a reform that is at least symbolically important, when deciding whether to grant leave to 
apply for post-adoption contact under the proposed section 51A(5), the court would be placed under 
a specific obligation to consider “any risk there might be of the proposed application disrupting the 
child’s life to such an extent that he or she would be harmed by it”, , mirroring the previous 
language in the more limited circumstances where leave was required but without including the 
nature of the application. This could be seen as a further setback for “open adoption”. In addition to 
these considerations, the court must unsurprisingly take account of the applicant’s “connection with 
the child”111 and “any representations made to the court” by the child or the adoptive parents.112 
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Decisions on post-adoption contact would expressly governed by the welfare checklist in section 1 
of the 2002 Act,
113
 reversing the Court of Appeal’s conclusion in Re J (Adopted Child: Contact) 
that the checklist in section 1 of the Children Act 1989 governed the matter.
114
 This adds clarity to 
the law and recognises that decisions on post-adoption contact, and not only on adoption itself, have 
life-long implications. That recognition, however, is undermined by the Act’s restrictive approach 
to leave. 
The Explanatory Notes to the Act clearly assert that the reforms to post-adoption contact 
have “the aim of reducing the disruption that inappropriate contact can cause to adoptive 
placements”,115 even if the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Children and Families 
insisted that what is now the Act enables birth parents and relatives “to apply to the court for 
contact orders where they feel it is necessary, and where such contact would genuinely be helpful 
and beneficial to the child”.116 The reduction was pursued in spite of the SCAL’s conclusion, while 
recognising that disruption can be damaging, that there was “general agreement” among its sources 
of evidence that legislation could not “provide a suitable for remedy” for such disruption where it 
occurred.
117
 This, in turn, was consistent with Neil et al’s response to the original consultation 
exercise, and there is a significant chance that the changes to permission would either have no effect 
or have more of an effect than was intended. 
It would of course be ridiculous for a judge steadfastly to avoid considering the risk 
specified in section 51A(5) even under the pre-2014 Act law, and the fact that the ordering of post-
adoption contact is currently limited to “extremely unusual” cases arguably minimises the practical 
effect of the reform and may render it pointless. Moreover, the change introduced by the Act in 
relation to post-adoption contact is less dramatic than its dilution of the duty to promote contact 
while the child is merely in foster care.
118
 It also falls short of the formal presumption against post-
adoption contact (once it is clear that a child will be adopted) that was originally proposed.
119
  
On the other hand, the Act’s inclusion of the instruction about disruption in spite of its clear 
relevance under the current law, combined with the reasonable assumption on the part of future 
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interpreters that section 9 is intended to have some substantive effect, risks suggesting that post-
adoption contact should be ordered even less readily that it already is, and even suggesting that 
local authorities should not encourage it where it does not need to be ordered as they currently do. 
At the Committee Stage in the House of Lords, Baroness Hamwee admirably attempted to balance 
the proposed section 51A by inserting an express requirement that the court consider “the benefit to 
the child of an order” for post-adoption contact when deciding upon a leave application.120 She was 
persuaded to withdraw her proposed amendment by a Government whip on the basis that the 
potential benefit of post-adoption contact is already to be considered by virtue of the welfare 
principle in section 1 of the 2002 Act and of an assertion (made without reference to any source) 
that contact is harmful for twice as many children as for whom it is beneficial. But the danger of 
over-interpretation of the distinctly negative emphasis in the section is particularly acute given that 
the instruction about considering harm relates to the increased need to consider leave and the mere 
application for post-adoption contact, jeapordising the legitimately low threshold exemplified by Re 
B, and not even to the substantive decision taken on the full merits of the case.  
An analogy can be drawn with the Family Justice Review’s concerns about a proposed 
legislative presumption (outside the context of adoption) that a child’s welfare is furthered through 
the involvement of both parents in his life, albeit that in that case a presumption of some sort 
appears on the face of the Act.
121
 The Government pursued that reform in spite of the Review’s 
misgivings that legislative change of this sort could create a “perception that there is a parental right 
to substantially shared or equal time for both parents”,122 citing the Australian experience of such a 
change.
123
 A balancing and clarifying amendment was at least successfully added to the relevant 
section,
124
 contrasting with the fate of Baroness Hamwee’s amendment on post-adoption contact. 
The court will be able to make a negative post-adoption contact order of its own motion 
under the Act when making an adoption order, but cannot make a positive one in that way.
125
 The 
inability to make an order for contact on its own initiative, when taken alongside the restrictive 
leave requirements that will be imposed on birth parents by the Act, rather dilutes the court’s duty 
                                                          
120
 HL Deb. vol. 748 cols. GC 167-69 (14 October 2013). 
121
 Children and Families Act 2014, s. 11. 
122
 D. Norgrove et al, Family Justice Review: Final Report (London 2011), at [4.23].  
123
 See H. Rhoades, “Legislating to Promote Children’s Welfare and the Quest for Certainty” [2012] Child & Family 
Law Quarterly 158 for discussion. Cf. F. Kaganas, “A Presumption that ‘Involvement’ of Both Parents is Best: 
Deciphering Law’s Messages” [2013] Child & Family Law Quarterly 270.  
124
 Children Act 1989, s. 1(2B), inserted by Children and Families Act 2014, s. 11(2). 
125
 Adoption and Children Act 2002, s. 51A(6). 
17 
 
to “consider whether there should be arrangements for allowing any person contact with the child” 
before making an adoption order.
126
 Admittedly, however, a court would be unlikely seriously to 
consider ordering contact where no-one had made an application for it. By analogy with the courts’ 
approach to contact with a non-resident legal parent,
127
 it is unlikely to be thought generally 
workable or consistent with a child’s best interests to order contact between that child and someone 
who did not want to have such contact, and Marshall has sought to defend a mother’s right to 
privacy and anonymity in relation to adoption following a concealed birth.
128
 That said, it would be 
odd if birth parents were to be given the near-veto on post-adoption contact that I have argued 
should not be given to adoptive parents, and ordering indirect contact with a reluctant birth parent 
could conceivably be appropriate in some cases in a way that ordering direct contact is unlikely to 
be. 
Of course, there are some adopted children for whom even indirect and infrequent contact 
with birth family members would be inappropriate, particularly if they have suffered intentional 
abuse at the hands of such people. There are other, less relationship-oriented, means through which 
such children can receive information about their biological origins than contact of any form.
129
 But 
where parenting has been “merely” negligent or deficient, perhaps as a result of mental illness, it is 
surely appropriate at least to investigate whether the ordering of post-adoption contact would serve 
the long-term interests of the particular child and (to a lesser extent)
130
 the birth parents, rather than 
simply following the wishes of the adoptive parents in almost all cases and reducing the power of 
the courts as the Act arguably does. It is significant that Sir Martin Narey suggested to the SACL 
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that “the notion that adopted children belong to another family with whom contact must be 
maintained was disconcerting and hurtful to adoptive parents and off-putting to potential 
adopters”.131 His view goes some way to explaining his surprisingly explicit suggestion in his 
foreword to the relevant Government consultation document that “birth family contact, including 
letterbox contact, should only take place when the adoptive parents”, and not apparently the court, 
are “satisfied that it continues to be in the interests of their child”.132 Implausibly, the main body of 
the paper similarly asserted that “[a]ny further contact between their child and their child’s birth 
parents is now a matter exclusively for the adoptive family”, albeit that at least it almost 
immediately conceded that “[a]doptive parents are only obligated to maintain contact where a 
contact order has been made”.133 Sir Martin’s view could place such adoptive parents in a stronger 
position than all other types of parent once a matter concerning a child’s upbringing comes before a 
court, putting this area at odds with the rest of child law.
134
 
Even if Sir Martin’s position could be said to be reflected in substance in the pre-existing 
law let alone under the Children and Families Act, it is unacceptable as a formal state of affairs. If 
adoption is to remain a means of providing permanence for children rather than a service for 
prospective adopters, and even if some prospective adoptive parents are indeed deterred by the idea 
of post-adoption contact, acceptable adopters may need to have a thicker skin than is implied by Sir 
Martin in the interests of the child’s welfare. Indeed, Neil et al express a fear that a restrictive 
approach to post-adoption contact could convey an undesirable “message” to prospective and actual 
adopters that fails to reflect “adopted children's need for open communication about adoption and 
acceptance of the child's birth heritage”.135 
In any case, Sir Martin’s view conflicts with the empirical finding that “virtually no [actual] 
adoptive parents felt that the contact had negatively affected their relationship with the child, and 
about half of adoptive parents believed that direct contact had brought about, or would lead to, 
benefits in their relationship with the adopted child”.136 Admittedly, Neil et al suggested that 
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contact is most beneficial “where birth relatives support the child's placement in the adoptive family 
and where adoptive parents have an open attitude about adoption”,137 which might cast doubt on the 
utility of ordered contact where the child has been adopted without parental consent and the 
adoptive parents are opposed to contact. But it should be noted that both courts
138
 and the 
legislature
139
 are willing to go to some lengths to order and enforce contact where two legal parents’ 
relationship has broken down except in unusual circumstances where that is not consistent with the 
welfare of the child. Moreover, Neil et al also found that “attitudes of both adoptive parents and 
birth relatives are not necessarily fixed” and “[b]oth adopters and birth relatives are sometimes 
more able to accept each other following the finality of the adoption order”,140 suggesting that an 
order encouraging contact in the early stages may lead to supportive contact in the longer term.  
The reforms in the Children and Families Act, however (if they are to have any substantive 
effect), create the risk that genuine investigations on the appropriateness of ordered post-adoption 
contact in the cases of individual children will occur even less frequently than they do under the 
current law, and that would clearly bring law and practice even further out of line unless local 
authorities were extremely strongly influenced by the policy messages sent out by the Act.
141
 
  
C. A Human Rights Audit 
 
It is unfortunate that the Joint Committee on Human Rights did not consider the proposed sections 
51A and 51B in depth in its legislative scrutiny report on the Children and Families Bill.
142
 The 
present sub-section of this article, however, considers the reforms from a human rights standpoint. 
Human rights obligations, of course, (uneasily)
143
 overlap with but are distinct from the welfare-
based considerations that in principle govern purely domestic child law. The European Convention 
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on Human Rights is considered first, with a focus on the right to respect for family life under 
Article 8, before the article moves on to consider the implications of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child for post-adoption contact. 
 
 
 
1. The European Convention on Human Rights 
 
An adoption order is a clear prima facie infringement of the child’s and the natural parents’ Article 
8 rights to respect for family life, albeit one that can be justified under Article 8(2). Lady Hale and 
Fortin suggest that “[t]he ability of birth parents to retain some contact with their child may…help 
to make compulsory adoption more Convention compliant”,144 while Choudhry and Herring express 
the view that Article 8 requires a refusal to grant post-adoption contact to be justified.
145
 Bainham 
has similarly contemplated the possibility of Article 8-based challenges by natural parents to post-
adoption contact decisions,
146
 though elsewhere he implies that “existing kinship links and 
contacts” can truly be preserved only by avoiding full adoption altogether.147  
In Re J, however, the Court of Appeal gave no consideration to the question whether the 
adopted child had an Article 8 right to respect for family life vis-à-vis her natural parents once her 
adoption occurred, and did say that it was “very far from obvious” that the natural parents’ rights to 
respect for family life with the child could survive the adoption at all,
148
 irrespective of whether 
interference with them could be justified under Article 8(2). This prior question whether the 
(presumably largely symmetrical) Article 8 “family life” rights of birth parents and adopted child 
vis-à-vis each other continued post-adoption had received little real attention in Strasbourg at that 
time.
149
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In R and H v United Kingdom,
150
 decided after Re J, some natural parents complained that 
the Northern Ireland High Court violated their right to respect for family life under Article 8 by 
freeing their child for adoption without parental consent.
151
 The parents had unsuccessfully argued, 
inter alia, that their refusal to consent was reasonable because it was unclear whether adopters who 
were open to post-adoption contact could be found. The judge's decision was upheld by the Court of 
Appeal
152
 and the House of Lords, with Lady Hale dissenting.
153
 The claim before the European 
Court failed, but some of its analysis (while limited) suggests that Article 8 is generally applicable 
to the issue of post-adoption contact. For example, the Court was persuaded by the argument that 
the Health and Social Services Trust responsible for the adoption should have been given six 
months to find adopters willing to consent to post-adoption contact before a freeing order was 
issued.
154
 Ultimately, however, the European Court was satisfied that the directions made by the 
Court of Appeal placed sufficient emphasis on post-adoption contact. It therefore rejected the 
suggestion that “the domestic courts allowed [the child] to be freed for adoption without proper 
regard for the fact that her interests, and those of the applicants, were best served by post-adoption 
contact”.155 While the Court did not expressly state that Article 8 encompasses post-adoption 
contact, and while R and H raised the broader issue of approving adoption without the consent of 
the natural parents, the significance that the Court implicitly attached to post-adoption contact 
suggests that Article 8 is relevant to this issue. 
In Aune v Norway, also decided after the English Court of Appeal gave judgment in Re J, 
the European Court was presented with a case from a legal system where post-adoption contact 
could not be ordered at all and would inevitably be left to the discretion of the adoptive parents.
156
 
On the facts of the case, all of the domestic organs had found that there was “almost absolute” 
certainty that the adoptive parents would remain open to contact between the relevant child and 
biological family.
157
 The European Court unanimously held that “the disputed measures did not in 
fact prevent the applicant from continuing to have a personal relationship with [the child] and did 
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not result in ‘cutting him off from his roots’ with respect to contact with his biological mother”.158 
The Court also held, however, that the domestic authorities “could reasonably consider that the 
applicant’s interest in maintaining a legal right of contact was outweighed by the interest in 
authorising adoption”.159 It was therefore satisfied that “the decision to deprive the applicant of 
parental responsibilities and to authorise the adoption was supported by relevant and sufficient 
reasons and, bearing in mind the national margin of appreciation, was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim of protecting [the child’s] best interests”.160 This indirectly suggests that a lack of 
post-adoption contact could in principle breach Article 8, but again the matter is far from clear and 
the decision might also suggest that the European Convention imposes no obligation for a state even 
to provide a mechanism whereby post-adoption can be ordered. Like R and H, moreover, Aune was 
significantly concerned with the broader issue of adoption itself in the absence of parental 
consent.
161
 Finally, while IS v Germany involves post-adoption contact,
162
 only the Statement of 
Facts and Questions to the Parties appear to be available at the time of writing and it can provide no 
further guidance on this issue. 
Where a child is taken into state care (but not adopted), the Strasbourg Court has 
emphasised that “a measure as radical as the total severance of contact” with a parent can also be 
justified “only in exceptional circumstances”,163 and that “any measures implementing temporary 
care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parents and the child”.164 In 
the light of its strong opposition to severing a child from its roots through adoption other than in the 
most exceptional circumstances,
165
 it would be undesirable on policy grounds for the European 
Court retrospectively to increase the magnitude of interference with an Article 8 right caused by an 
adoption by holding that it eliminated “family life” that had previously existed. Paradoxically, 
however, the court’s own emphasis on the draconian and exceptional nature of adoption as regards 
family life may well have made it more difficult to sustain an argument that family life for the 
purposes of Article 8 subsists after adoption occurs.  
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In any case, the Court’s approach to adoption in general is distinctly ambivalent. In YC v 
United Kingdom, the majority of Court asserted both that “in cases concerning the placing of a child 
for adoption, which entails the permanent severance of family ties, the best interests of the child are 
paramount”, and that “family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances 
and…everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ 
the family”.166 Lord Wilson, for his part, has described the decision as demonstrating “the high 
degree of justification which article 8 demands of a determination that a child should be adopted or 
placed in care with a view to adoption”,167 but post-adoption contact was not directly addressed in 
the judgment in YC. 
One case in which an adopted person sought to invoke a right to respect for family life with 
a birth family post-adoption was Odièvre v France.
168
 The applicant challenged the French system 
of anonymous births which prevented her from accessing information about her natural mother. She 
argued that “her request for information about strictly personal aspects of her history and childhood 
came within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention” and that “[e]stablishing her basic identity 
was an integral part not only of her ‘private life’, but also of her ‘family life’ with her natural 
family, with whom she hoped to establish emotional ties…”.169 This was contested by the French 
Government, which argued that “the guarantee of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 
presupposed the existence of a family”, and that the case law required there “to be at the very least 
close personal ties”.170 Applying this to the facts of Odièvre, the Government argued that “no 
family life within the meaning of Article 8…existed between the applicant and her natural mother”, 
on the basis that, “the applicant had never met her mother, while the latter had at no point expressed 
any interest in the applicant or regarded her as her child”.171 
In any case, the European Court of Human Rights offered no insight into the question 
whether the applicant in Odièvre could have a right to respect for family life in relation to her 
natural parents. It skirted the issue and held that as “the applicant's purpose [was] not to call into 
question her relationship with her adoptive parents but to discover the circumstances in which she 
was born and abandoned, including the identity of her natural parents and brother” the court should 
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consider the case “from the perspective of private life, not family life, since the applicant's claim… 
is based on her inability to gain access to information about her origins”.172  
The Court in Odièvre found that the private life provision in Article 8 was applicable 
although it afforded a wide margin of appreciation to the state and found that the right had not been 
violated in this case. This analysis, while more concerned with information than contact, fits with 
Harris-Short’s contention that it is easier to fit post-adoption contact within “private life” as 
compared to “family life”,173 and the European Court has explicitly asserted that close relationships 
short of “family life” would generally fall within the scope of “private life”.174 Dr. Hughes and I 
have discussed the “private life” implications of post-adoption contact in detail elsewhere.175 
It can be seen that the Article 8 implications of post-adoption contact are not clear-cut, 
reducing the usefulness of the Convention in this context. But if there are Article 8-based problems 
with English Law’s approach to the matter, these are surely worsened by the Act if it brings about a 
change in approach. The attempt to reduce the scope for an application for post-adoption contact 
even to be heard risks violating the procedural requirements of Article 8, which the European Court 
has emphasised mean that “the decision-making process involved in measures of interference must 
be fair and such as to afford due respect to the interests safeguarded by” that Article.176 While the 
fact that the restriction on hearings is at least formally based on a perceived harm to a child might 
ultimately mean that the interference can be justified under Article 8(2), and the existence of Article 
8 rights between adopter and adoptee must be borne in mind,
177
 this will be a matter for ripe debate 
once the post-adoption contact provisions in the Children and Families Act come into effect.  
 
2. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
Unlike the ECHR, the UNCRC as a whole has not yet been incorporated into English law,
178
 which 
is a state of affairs that continues to cause concern for the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
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(the Committee).
179
 Lady Hale has nevertheless emphasised that the UNCRC imposes “binding 
obligation[s] in international law”.180 Moreover, in a Supreme Court judgment citing my work on 
whether the English Law on adoption decisions per se is compatible with the UNCRC,
181
 Lord 
Neuberger said explicitly that “the 2002 Act must be construed and applied bearing in mind the 
provisions of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989”.182 
 Article 21 of the UNCRC requires states inter alia to “ensure that the best interests of the 
child shall be the paramount consideration” in the context of adoption.183 But as Hodgkin and 
Newell emphasise in Unicef’s Implementation Handbook, “[t]he Convention is indivisible and its 
articles interdependent”, meaning that “Article 21 should not be considered in isolation”.184 This 
has significant implications, since the other provisions of the Convention might provide clues as to 
the meaning of “best interests” (a notoriously uncertain concept)185 under Article 21. This is true 
notwithstanding the fact that those other provisions are themselves qualified, and that the notion of 
indivisibility of rights is clearly problematic where multiple rights appear to conflict.  
Article 21 of the UNCRC must therefore be read alongside several of its other provisions. 
Article 7(1), for example, states that a child has “as far as possible, the right to know and be cared 
for by his or her parents”. Hodgkin and Newell note that the phrase “as far as possible” “appear[s] 
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to provide a much stricter and less subjective qualification than ‘best interests’”, although they 
concede that consideration of what is “possible” must include consideration of “best interests”.186  
In addition to Article 7, Article 8(1) obliges states to respect a child’s right to his or her 
identity and “family relations”. It is limited to those relations recognised by law and purports to 
prohibit only “unlawful” interference, but this has not prevented the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child from criticising states’ approach to identity even when the relevant rules are enshrined in 
national law.
187
 Logically, Hodgkin and Newell do not consider that a state could use its own 
national law substantially to limit the scope of this right.
188
 A similar argument could be made in 
relation to Article 7, which requires states to “ensure the implementation of the[ ] rights [it confers] 
in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
instruments”.189  
Moreover, Article 9 mandates states to ensure that “a child shall not be separated from his or 
her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review 
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is necessary for 
the best interests of the child”.190 Those best interests, in turn, can be determined only via due 
consideration of the child’s relationship with the parents. 
A complication as regards the rights of a child post-adoption is the following declaration, 
made by the UK Government upon ratification of the Convention: 
 
The United Kingdom interprets the references in the Convention to “parents” to mean only 
those persons who, as a matter of national law, are treated as parents. This includes cases 
where the law regards a child as having only one parent, for example where a child has been 
adopted by one person only…191 
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On this interpretation, any reference to “parents” apparently becomes a reference to the adoptive 
parents, and not the birth parents, once an adoption order is (validly) made.
192
 Nevertheless, this 
declaration could in itself be said to jeopardise the child’s right to establish his identity even if it is 
not possible for his birth parents to care for him or her. This is similar to the difficulty that exists as 
regards the survival of Article 8 ECHR rights to respect for family life as between birth parent and 
child post-adoption, discussed in the previous sub-section. 
 In any event, post-adoption contact with birth relatives is particularly relevant in the light of 
the child’s UNCRC rights to preserve his identity and (subject to the UK’s declaration on the 
meaning of “parents”) to know his parents, and the Committee has recently expressed concern 
about an Israeli statute that “allows hiding from a child the fact that he or she has been adopted”.193 
Post-adoption contact could be seen as a way of protecting a child’s identity-related rights in cases 
where adoption was deemed necessary in order to secure the outcome consistent with the best 
interests of the child.  
Moreover, Article 9(3) of the UNCRC obliges states to “respect the right of the child who is 
separated from one or both parents to maintain personal relations and direct contact with both 
parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests”. This provision would 
again be subject to the UK’s declaration on the meaning of “parents”, and Article 9 is not 
specifically aimed at full adoption. But Hodgkin and Newell cite poverty being a ground for 
adoption as an example of a provision that was incompatible with Article 9.
194
 They also deem 
“simple” adoption195 to be a practice within the scope of Article 9,196 and make several references to 
Article 9 in the Handbook’s chapter on Article 21.197 It also seems particularly appropriate to apply 
Article 9 to English adoption law, since there it has effectively become an extension of, or an 
alternative to, the care system. In any case, continuity of upbringing for the purposes of Article 20 
has been interpreted to include contact with family members where the child has been adopted.
198
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However, the English courts’ approach to post-adoption contact again has the potential to 
bring them into conflict with the UNCRC, in spite of Lord Neuberger’s subsequent emphasis on the 
importance of the UNCRC in Re B. Admittedly and inevitably, the Court of Appeal in Re J did 
attempt to justify their conclusion on the basis of the child’s welfare, but we have seen that the 
decision was extremely deferential to the adoptive parents. Lord Neuberger’s judgment in that case 
did not self-evidently demonstrate that that limited contact was “contrary” to the child’s best 
interests as prima facie required by Article 9 given the other interests protected by the Convention, 
even if a supportable conclusion was reached on the facts. The restrictions in the Children and 
Families Act, apparently aimed at limiting circumstances where a full hearing on post-adoption 
contact will occur, clearly create further difficulties in this regard. 
The restrictions on the availability of a full hearing also have the potential to prejudice the 
child’s rights under Article 12 of the UNCRC. That Article requires state parties to “assure to the 
child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all 
matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age 
and maturity of the child”.199 There is also a more specific right to “be provided the opportunity to 
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or 
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law”.200 This is clearly a qualified right limited with reference to national law, and a child 
would be able to make representations on whether or not a birth parent should be given leave to 
apply for a post-adoption contact order. That said, the substance of the right to be heard might well 
be difficult to confer upon a child if the likelihood of a full hearing on the merits of post-adoption 
contact is reduced following the Act’s passing. It is significant that the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child has emphasised the particular importance of Article 12 in the general context of adoption, 
“the ‘best interests’ of the child cannot be defined without consideration of the child’s views”.201 
Once an adopted child has reached the age of 18, he can choose to be placed on an 
“Adoption Contact Register” if he wishes to make contact with relatives.202 Details of relatives who 
wish to make contact are stored in another part of the register, and information can be disclosed in 
appropriate circumstances if there is a match. But this does not secure an adopted person’s UNCRC 
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rights while that person remains a child, particularly given the lack of a clear entitlement to be told 
that he or she is adopted
203
 or a willingness to order contact where the adoptive parents are opposed. 
There are therefore several respects in which the compatibility of the both the pre-existing 
law (taken to include both legislative and judicial elements) and the 2014 Act with the UNCRC is 
open to question. That said, it has is also clear that there are weaknesses and conflicts inherent in 
the Convention itself, since it fails to provide, in Alston’s words, “a specific and readily 
ascertainable recipe for resolving the inevitable tensions and conflicts that arise in a given situation 
among the different rights recognized”.204 Whatever one’s view of the merits of adoption and post-
adoption contact, the difficult process of implementing the UNCRC cannot easily be considered 
complete in England and Wales merely because the best interests of the child are expressed to be 
the paramount consideration in post-adoption decisions.
205
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The twin reforms in the Children and Families Act of procuring more adoptions out of care and 
purporting to be even more cautious about ordering post-adoption contact might have a certain logic 
to them. Indeed, they are consistent with the older philosophy that if adoption is truly appropriate, 
post-adoption contact is unlikely to be so. They are not, however, consistent with modern ideas 
about open adoption, or assertions like that in MF to the effect that adoption and contact afterwards 
can be complementary rather than antagonistic.
206
 Moreover, they are not clearly underpinned by 
solid empirical evidence. If the state continues to insist on severing the legal ties between increasing 
numbers of its biologically related citizens, it should surely be all the more careful to preserve their 
de facto relationships when appropriate. Ultimately, the post-adoption contact reforms in the 
Children and Families Act either reflect the current law (in which case they are unnecessary and 
represent law reform for rhetorical purposes and without due consideration of the pre-existing law) 
or they risk introducing more of an effective presumption against post-adoption contact, which is 
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undesirable because it jeopardises individualised welfare-based decision-making and pays scant 
regard to the possible human rights claims of adopted children and their birth parents.
207
 In the 
course of its discussion, however, this article has also highlighted the limitations of international 
human rights treaties as regards providing clear answers on a particular and sensitive issue within 
family law. In any case, it is likely that the post-adoption contact provisions in the Children and 
Families Act will prove to be troublesome. 
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